The collapse of Enron in December 2001 has generated considerable controversy over corporate accounting practices and the quality of financial information disclosed to investors. The ongoing concern and associated volatility in stock prices underscores the importance of transparency to the efficient functioning of financial markets. Indeed, the President and the Congress responded to the resulting turmoil with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of July 2002. The new law attempts to increase the transparency of corporate financial statements, reform the oversight of accounting, and thereby restore investor confidence. It requires chief financial officers (CFOs) of corporations to improve the accuracy and reliability of their disclosures to investors.
On December 11, 2002, the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations staff issued a report on "Fishtail, Bacchus, Sundance, and Slapshot", four Enron transactions (US Senate, 2002) . The four are examples of the complex and allegedly deceptive transactions that many identify as Enron's signature. The report concludes that "none of the four could have been completed without the backing and active participation of a major financial institution willing to facilitate a client's deceptive accounting or tax transactions". Furthermore, the report charges that "Citigroup and Chase each deliberately misused structured finance techniques to help Enron engage in deceptive accounting or tax strategies, and were rewarded with millions of dollars and favorable consideration in other business dealings". These types of changes have not been confined to Enron or just these two financial institutions. Similar allegations of inadequate transparency were occurring in other public companies and financial institutions in the US at the same time. The potential loss of investor confidence in the honesty and integrity of US companies and financial institutions is an ongoing problem that has yet to be fully resolved.
This was not the only time that a corporate crisis resulted in new laws and heated debate. An earlier example from the 1990s was the bankruptcy of Campeau Corporation, which led observers later to ask how Campeau's lawyers could have provided appropriate legal counsel on the transactions leading up to the firm's collapse. A broader debate of the same type ensued, centering on the degree to which lawyers and clients are functionally one (Painter, 1994) .
Research shows that the cost of equity capital decreases as the disclosure level increases [Botosan (1997) , confirmed in Botosan and Plumlee (2000) ]. Furthermore, it has been found that there is no association between the cost of equity capital and the level of investor relations activities. These results hold for small firms as well as for large and more heavily researched firms. It is also the case across a diverse group of industries and over a number of years. So what did CFOs think about the actual state of corporate accounting and disclosure in countries around the world just prior to Enron's collapse?
Fortuitously, just prior to Enron's collapse and the ensuing controversy, the PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Study of Transparency and Sustainability conducted a survey of CFOs in countries around the globe regarding accounting and disclosure issues. The timing of the survey enables one to assess and compare the views of those corporate executives directly responsible for financial disclosure information just before the Enron debacle and thus free of any bias due to recent developments in the US. While the complexity of financial reporting varies within and between countries considerably based on the level of development of securities markets and advances in corporate finance, the common themes of timely and accurate information disclosure transcend both market and national boundaries. So what did CFOs say about the state of accounting and disclosure in their respective countries?
An interesting consensus emerges about the gaps in the information that is reported, which may impede capital market development. The answers to the survey are reported in Tables 1 and 2 . Both tables are based upon the responses to several questions asked of CFOs in 40 countries during the fall of 2000 and the spring of 2001. The specific executives surveyed were selected based upon consultation with country experts of PricewaterhouseCoopers. Table 1 presents the views of the CFOs regarding the relative importance of three issues currently receiving widespread attention in the US. In 22 countries, more CFOs considered the lack of adequate disclosure of information by companies to be a bigger issue than either corrupt business practices or a lack of effective accounting guidelines. In 17 countries, more CFOs considered corrupt business practices to be a bigger issue than either of the other two. Only in the United Kingdom did more CFOs consider the lack of effective accounting guidelines to be the issue of most concern. Corporate CFOs in many countries at different levels of development and in various parts of the world therefore considered disclosure or corruption to be a problem even before the Enron debacle.
The data in Table 1 indicate that just as it was considered to be a problem in many other industrial countries, the US CFOs considered the adequacy of information disclosure to be a problem before Enron's collapse. Conversely, and perhaps understandably, CFOs in the developing countries considered corruption to be the more important problem. This means that CFOs were well aware of the need for accounting, disclosure, and business practice improvements before the Enron episode.
Given this concern expressed by CFOs about the lack of adequate disclosure, Table 2 many countries from the standpoint of information that is not disclosed to investors. To the extent that the information implied by these questions exists, the obvious question is why is it not being disclosed? Several points can be made about the views of the CFOs regarding the five different types of information disclosure asked about in Table 2: • In half of the 40 countries, 26% or more of the CFOs stated that they do not disclose the full extent of their company's risk taking to investors. The highest percentage was in Botswana at 63%. In both New Zealand and Norway, the percentages are relatively high compared to other industrial nations at 53% and 47%, respectively. The figure for the US is 15%.
• In half of the 40 countries, 26% or more of the CFOs surveyed do not disclose their company's strategy to investors. In Botswana, 72% of the CFOs said that such information was not disclosed. Perhaps surprisingly, in France, the percentage was relatively high, at 43%. In the US only 8% did not disclose this information.
• In half of the 40 countries, 29% or more of the CFOs indicated that their companies do not disclose "forward looking" information, such as targets, plans and financial goals, to investors. The highest figure is for Ghana at 83%. Among the industrial countries, only in France do more than 50% of the CFOs not disclose information about corporate planning. The figure for the US is 31%. • In half of the 40 countries, 31% or more of the CFOs indicate that they do not disclose nonfinancial information that could be used to help assess the company's financial prospects, such as information on new products and intellectual property developments. In Botswana, the figure is the highest at 74%. Norway, New Zealand and Australia are the only industrial countries in which CFOs report figures exceeding 50%. In the US, the percentage is the same as the median, 31%.
• In half of the 40 countries, 20% or more of the CFOs indicated their companies do not disclose information about major business units. Again, Botswana ranks highest at 58%. Among the industrial nations, France and Norway are not far behind at 43% and 47%, respectively. In the US, the figure is 15%.
Overall, these responses by corporate CFOs about accounting, disclosure and business practices show that whatever problems exist in the US, they also exist in other countries around the world. The problems, moreover, predate the collapse of Enron and all the ensuing problems associated with it as well as at other companies that subsequently reported severe financial difficulties and against which allegations of misleading financial reports and other misconduct have been made. Clearly, only through the disclosure of accurate and reliable information to investors can financial markets efficiently allocate funds to their most productive use. And in this regard more work remains to be done to better inform investors regarding the ongoing financial condition of firms.
But one should not stop here. Anyone doing "Enron-like" deals better know enough accounting to credibly evaluate any and all financial transactions. Furthermore, given the importance of good corporate governance one should expect both lawyers and accountants to play a central role in helping create more transparent financial reports and preventing misconduct. An important but often overlooked lesson from Enron is the danger that prevailing professional cultures create a gap between law and accounting. The intersection of law and accounting is so central to business life that business lawyers should obtain more than a rudimentary grasp of accounting principles to be considered fully competent. Cunningham (2002) documents a "lamentable decline" in the resources law schools have allocated to accounting over the past 27 years. The chief normative implication in Cunningham is that "the professional duty of competence should compel business lawyers to obtain a minimum level of accounting knowledge". This is clearly wise advice given recent events in corporate America.
